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1. Introduction 
Securing a computer system is always a battle of wits: the adversary tries to locate holes to 
sneak in, whereas the protector tries to close them. Transmitting messages through a 
publicly accessible medium whilst having the content concealed from the adversary’s eyes is 
traditionally accomplished using mathematical transformations. These are practically 
irreversible, unless some additional information – called the key – is available, making the 
secret accessible for the legitimate holder(s) of the key. Ever since the concept of perfect 
secrecy has rigorously been formalized by Shannon (1949), it has been known that 
unbreakable security is bought at the cost of keys that equal the message in terms of length. 
In addition, the key is required to be random and must be discarded immediately after 
usage. This pushed the concept of unconditional security out of reach for implementation in 
computer networks (though diplomatic and military applications existed), until 1984, where 
the idea of quantum cryptography was born by Bennett & Brassard (1984). The unique 
feature of this novel type communication is its usage of information carriers other than 
electrical pulses. By encoding bits in the polarization plane of single photons, the 
information becomes essentially not cloneable, as Wootters & Zurek (1982) have shown, and 
any attempt can be detected. This rendered the one-time pad practical in real-life electronic 
networks and unconditional security no longer needed to remain a dream. 
Classical cryptography widely relies on unproven conjectures regarding the difficulty of 
solving computational problems. The field of public key cryptography draws its power from 
the infeasibility of reverting simple algebraic operations within large finite groups, but no 
proof has yet been discovered that rules out the existence of efficient algorithms to solve 
those problems. The sole indicator of security is thus the absence of any publication proving 
the assumptions wrong. But there is yet no other indication than pure hope for this to be 
true. Symmetric techniques, although conceptually different, come with no better arguments 
to support their security. Although these may lack much of the structure that public key 
systems enjoy and are thus harder to analyze, a rigorous proof of security or mathematical 
framework for proving security is also not available. 
In this work, we attempt taking a step towards providing a rigorous and easy-to-use 
decision-theoretic framework for proving security. Results are formulated with applications 
to quantum networks, but we emphasize that the framework is in no way limited to these. 
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1.1 The problem of perfect end-to-end secrecy 
Quantum cryptography claims to bring perfect secrecy to a given line, but speaking 
honestly, it is no more than this. Using a carrier that is sufficiently fragile to rule out copying 
it, naturally raises the question of how much distance can be bridged? In fact, nowadays 
available quantum cryptography allows for communication over a distance of up to 144 km, 
as demonstrated by Schmitt-Manderbach et al. (2007), but arbitrary distances can yet not be 
bridged. Although theoretical results due to Lo & Chau (1999) indicate that the noise 
problem can be overcome, making arbitrary ranges theoretically possible, building networks 
is inevitable for a global roll-out. Existing solutions mostly rely on trusted relay for that 
matter. However, why attack the quantum line, if attacking a relay node is fully sufficient? 
Under the assumption of perfectly protected lines, recent results indicate that without pre-
existing secrets that are exclusively known to the sender and the receiver, end-to-end-
security is only achievable under hard constraints on the network topology. To be more 
precise, let G be a graph that models a network. Let V(G), E(G) be the sets of vertices and 
edges of G, and assume the sender s and receiver r to be parts of G, that is {s, r}  ⊆ V(G). The 
adversary can be modelled by a set A ⊆ 2V(G)\{s, r} (the powerset of V(G)\{s, r}), that is we 
assume that a selection of subsets of vertices can be compromised. If k such sets can become 
conquered simultaneously, then we face a k-active adversary. An infected vertex v is 
assumed fully under the adversary’s control, so a message passing through v can be read, 
blocked or modified and v is free to create as many new messages as desired. There is no 
limitation on computational power or knowledge of the adversary. 
If removing from G the vertices in any k sets in the adversary structure A cannot disconnect 
s and r in G, then we call the graph A(k)(s,r)-subconnected. If, by doing so, the network 
cannot be disconnected at all, then the graph is said to be A(k)-subconnected. 
Referring to these notions, a network permits perfectly secure message delivery from s to r if 
and only if the graph G is A(2)(s,r)-subconnected. The reader may consult Ashwin Kumar 
et al. (2002) for a proof. Different, yet no less stringent requirements are imposed by Wang & 
Desmedt (2008): among related results, the following necessary condition best highlights the 
difficulty of achieving unconditional security in a real-life network: if for u ≥ 1, 3(k − u) + 1 ≥ 
k + 1 directed node-disjoint paths from s to r exist, then a necessary condition for perfectly 
secure message transmission from s to r against a k-active adversary is that there are u 
directed node disjoint paths (these u paths are also disjoint from the 3(k − u) + 1 paths from s 
to r) from r to s. 
The described adversary model applies to many situations, as for example machines 
running certain software may all suffer from the same security holes. Networks equipped 
with devices from different vendors may be considered vulnerable if one vendor’s devices 
turn out to be insecure. A k-active adversary would correspond to k vendors cooperating, or 
equivalently arise, if k vendors obtained the same malicious module from a single 
fraudulent manufacturer, turning a heterogeneous set of products into a possible backdoor 
for an adversary. 
1.2 Decision theory and system security 
Many results either guarantee or rule out perfectly secret communication, but this might not 
be satisfactory. If perfectly secure communication is not possible, then how much is 
achievable with the given resources? A variety of security metrics has been proposed, but a 
measure of security is yet missing. This work summarizes a decision-theoretic approach to 
quantifying risk in terms that can be specified to best suit the application at hand. 
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Protecting business assets is the core goal that security engineers are in pursuit of, so 
measuring the quality of a protection mechanism in terms of values of the protected asset is 
certainly a more convincing argument than hoping that relaying nodes in quantum 
networks are trustworthy, or no efficient solution algorithm for some computational 
problem has yet been discovered. 
The problem of measuring security has been tackled by a vast number of authors. Assessing 
security is commonly achieved by security metrics or scores, whereas the latter is considered 
for sole comparative purposes and does not have an interpretation on its own. The common 
vulnerability scoring scheme (see Houmb & Franqueira (2009) is one example for a scoring 
technique. Other taxonomies like proposal of Innerhofer-Oberperfler & Breu (2009) are as 
well subjective and may help decision-makers, but are not designed to support a further 
mathematical treatment. 
Decision support systems like CAULDRON by Mas (2008) cook up reports generated by 
vulnerability scanners to boil down a vast amount of information to a manageable lot of 
recommendations. The models we describe can naturally benefit from these systems, and 
are thus considered an add-on for a standard topological vulnerability analysis (cf. Jajodia 
et al. (2005) for details on the latter). In particular, our results will generalize the assertions 
about the (im)possibility of perfectly secure communication as cited above. An approach 
that is closely related to our model has been given by Ying et al. (2006) and Mavronicolas 
et al. (2005). These approaches consider less general scenarios than we do, and suffer from 
the need for accurate adversary models. We demonstrate how this requirement can 
elegantly be dropped, while simultaneously simplifying a subsequent analysis.  
2. Modelling 
The modelling approach proposed in the following requires identification of security 
primitives of a given network. Its core ingredient is an enumeration of possibilities for 
transmission and parameter selection, and its output will be a game-theoretic model. For 
convenience of the reader, we review some necessary basics of game theory and multipath 
transmission, to illustrate the required input for a powerful model 
2.1 Game-theoretic foundations 
It is useful to collect some tools from game-theory that will help establishing the results 
presented here. A (non-cooperative n-person) game Γ = (N, S, H) is a triple composed from a set 
N = {1,2, … , n} of players being able to choose actions from their corresponding strategies 
within the set of sets S = {PS1, PS2, . . . , PSn}, such that the i-th player, when taking the action 
si ∈ PSi from his set PSi of possible pure strategies, receives the payoff ui(si, s−i), where ui ∈ H 
and s−i denotes the vector of pure strategies chosen by i’s opponents. The set H thus 
comprises the set of payoff functions for each player. A probability distribution over the set 
PSi is called a (mixed) strategy. We will exclusively refer to mixed strategies in the following, 
and denote the set of distributions over PSi as Si (note that the set of pure strategies is 
included in the set of distributions by considering a pure strategy as a Dirac-mass located at 
the pure strategy si). A (Nash-)equilibrium is a strategy-profile s* = (s1*, . . . , sn*) such that  
ui(si, s*-i) ≤ ui(s*i, s*-i)   ∀i ∈ N. 
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In other words, no player can benefit by solely deviating from the equilibrium strategy. The 
possibility of a gain when several players cooperate is not ruled out however. This is not 
topic of this work. 
If all strategy sets are finite (assumed in the following), then the utility for a mixed strategy 
is the expected (average) utility over an infinite number of repetitions of the game. In other 
words, if (x, y) are the strategies (discrete probability distributions) of player 1 and 2, 
respectively, then the expected utilities are given by the bilinear forms  
u1(x, y) = xTAy  and  u2(x,y) = xTBy, 
where A∈Rn×m, B∈Rn×m (for n = |PS1|, m = |PS2|) are the game-matrices. The full two-player 
game is denoted as the triple Γ = ({1, 2}, {S1, S2}, {A, B}). If A = –B, then the game is called 
zero-sum, and its value v(Γ) is given as the value of the function at the saddle-point, which is  
v(Γ) = maxx miny xTAy. 
It can be determined upon linear optimization, as described by Schlee (2004).  
2.2 Multipath transmission 
We have already summarized two results characterizing the possibility of perfectly secure 
message transmission in the introduction. A popular for circumventing the person-in-the-
middle attack is relying on several paths, over which messages are propagated 
independently. We shall not burden ourselves with the intricate details of error-correcting 
codes and how these relate to the concepts of secret sharing, and refer the reader to McElice 
& Sarwate (1981) for details. Recent protocols embodying the ideas of correctable shares for 
multipath transmission are found in the work of Fitzi et al. (2007) and Wang & Desmedt 
(2008), and we confine ourselves to remarking that perfectly secure message transmission is 
possible under a few assumptions: 
1. An encoding is available that allows to divide a message into pieces such that any 
subset (of pieces) of limited cardinality does not provide any information about the 
secret itself. This is achieved by standard secret-sharing, as we will summarize later. 
2. The network topology ensures the existence of several node-disjoint paths that connect 
any two nodes in the network. Results from graph theory (see Chartrand & Zhang 
(2005)) characterize suitable networks. Procedures for building such topologies from 
scratch have been developed in Rass (2005), and algorithms for determining optimal 
extensions of existing networks have been devised by Rass & Schartner (2009b). 
Error-correction facilities that are inherently available within some secret-sharing schemes 
can be exploited to further increase security and reliability, however, are not a must for our 
upcoming considerations.   
Let us review a simple form of secret sharing here that will become a theoretical asset for 
later conclusions. Given a secret s ∈ [0, n – 1], choose t random numbers ri ∈ [0, n – 1], and 
set rt+1 = s ⊕ r1 ⊕ … ⊕ rt, where ⊕ denotes the bitwise exclusive or operation. It is evident 
that unless all values r1, …, rt, rt+1 are known, the secret remains one-time pad encrypted 
with the exclusive-or of the unknown components, and thus perfectly concealed. The values 
r1, …, rt, rt+1 are the shares that arose from s. The core idea of multipath transmission is to 
send each share over its own channel that does not intersect any other channel in the 
network. Unless an adversary has (t+1) nodes conquered, no information about s can leak 
out. Practical multipath transmission protocols utilize a more sophisticated form of secret-
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sharing, where shares are created as points on a chosen (random) polynomial. Unless a 
sufficient number of such points are known, the polynomial, and therefore the secret it 
embeds in its constant term, remains protected from the adversary’s eyes. The advantage 
over the previously sketched scheme is its resilience against loss of shares up to the extent of 
the threshold. This comes at the price of higher computational effort, as calculations have to 
be performed in large finite fields. 
The methodology that is presented in the following naturally captures a much wider range 
of situations; however, we stick with a multipath scenario for illustrative purposes. 
2.3 Setting up the model  
Given a network at hand, mapping it into a model that permits decision-theoretic treatment 
proceeds in several steps. Each step is expanded below, starting with a definition capturing 
some terminology. Notice that in the sequel, we explicitly consider secret and reliable 
transmission, which is assumed available in various ways over the given network. Degrees 
of freedom that are available to the sender of a message comprise the following: 
transmission paths, encoding schemes (including encryption) and protocol parameters. We 
will assume a multipath transmission scenario (for otherwise perfect secrecy over multi-hop 
connections is ruled out under weak conditions as shown previously), and take the 
encoding to be fixed (as prescribed by the hardware devices). However, we can determine 
the path through the network. 
Definition 1: A pure strategy is a set of node-disjoint paths that connect a sender Alice to a 
receiver Bob. The set of all pure strategies is denoted as PS. A mixed strategy is a probability 
distribution over PS. We denote the set of all such (discrete) distributions over PS as S, and 
refer to x ∈ S simply as a strategy. 
Speaking in game-theoretic terms, we refer to a pair of honest instances Alice and Bob as 
player 1, and call player 2 the adversary. Consequently, the sets of pure strategies are PS1 
and PS2, with corresponding strategy sets S1 and S2. The methodology comprises five steps: 
Step 1. Identification of pure transmission strategies: The expert shall enumerate all 
degrees of freedom that a sender enjoys when initiating a transmission. This in 
particular includes all sets of node-disjoint paths that can be used for multipath 
transmission. All meaningful choices are collected in the set PS1 of pure strategies. 
Step 2. Identification of pure attacks strategies: The expert shall enumerate all nodes that 
are vulnerable to an attack. This could be an assumption of the number of nodes 
that can simultaneously be compromised or a more complex adversary structure. In 
particular, this analysis should account for software security flaws that could be 
exploited. The finite set of options that are open to the adversary makes up the set 
PS2 of pure strategies. 
Step 3. Setting up the utility taxonomy: The expert shall specify a scoring scheme that 
applies to the outcome of a transmission. Examples include the binary set I = {0, 1} 
with 0 meaning failure of a transmission, and 1 indicating a successful secret 
delivery. Finer discrete or even continuous scales can be based on a message 
priority ranking, or on the amount of Shannon-entropy that a message is tied to. We 
will frequently use the set I = {0, 1} in the following. 
Step 4. Setting up the model matrix: For every combination (si, sj) ∈ PS1 × PS2, identify the 
outcome of an attack and assign to the variable uij the score according to the 
ranking I. Notice that uij = u1(si1, sj2) is the utility for the honest parties. For instance, 
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with I = {0, 1}, if a successful transmission using the pure strategy si ∈ PS1 would 
resist an attack via strategy sj ∈ PS2, then we set uij = 1. Otherwise we would write 
uij = 0 to indicate the adversary’s success. The model matrix is denoted as A and has 
the entries uij. 
Step 5. Analysis and Conclusions: The model matrix is the sole ingredient for any further 
analysis of the model. Conclusions are obtained from the results to follow. 
Example 1: To illustrate the modelling process, consider a network topology as shown in 
Fig. 1 with two instances Alice and Bob who wish to communicate.  
Modeling step 1: Assume that Alice and Bob have picked three pairs of shortest node-disjoint 
paths, disregarding other possibly longer paths. So player 1’s set of pure strategies is 
denoted as PS1 = {s11, s21, s31}, and given by 
• s11: Use paths (s, 1), (1, 2), (2, t) and (s, 3), (3, 6), (6, t), 
• s21: Use paths (s, 1), (1, 2), (2, t) and (s, 4), (4, 5), (5, t) 
• s31: Use paths (s, 3), (3, 6), (6, t) and (s, 4), (4, 5), (5, t) 
Modeling step 2: Eve strategies for attacking are given by PS1 = {s12, s22, s32}, where 
• s12: Compromise nodes 1 and 3, 
• s22: Compromise nodes 1 and 4, 
• s32: Compromise nodes 3 and 4, 
modeling a situation in which two out of three vulnerable nodes {1, 3, 4} can be 
compromised  simultaneously.  
Modeling step 3: The utility taxonomy is chosen as I = {0, 1}, where 0 indicates failure of a 
secret transmission, and 1 means success. This scale considers loss of any secret content 
equally harmful.  
 
s t
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Fig. 1. Example Network Topology 
Modeling step 4: Writing down every possible combination of pure strategies in a matrix, 
with entry 1 if the attack fails, we end up with the following table, directly representing the 
utility function u1: PS1 × PS2 → {0, 1}, specified by a tableau (game-matrix, model-matrix): 
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The final step is the formal analysis of the model. We defer this until the formal results have 
been presented. 
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3. Decisions from incomplete models 
An accurate game-theoretic model would call for the specification of the adversary’s payoffs 
in order to optimally count his intrusion attempts. Unfortunately, we have no method of 
reliably eliciting the intentions and benefits that an attacker gains. Furthermore, we may be 
unable to observe our unknown opponent’s payoffs at all, which rules out any chance of 
learning the adversary’s payoff structure from experience. The game-theoretic model is thus 
incomplete in two respects: 
1. We have no way of reliably determining the utility for the second player. 
2. We have no mechanism of detecting our own success, nor can we observe the 
adversary’s success. This may not apply for scenarios in which the adversary is active, 
so that an intervention can be detected, but a passively eavesdropping intruder will 
most likely remain undetected. 
The remedy is switching to a zero-sum game, assuming the adversary’s intentions and 
payoffs to be the precise opposite of our own ones. Though intuitively evident, the validity 
of this approach is formally founded (see Rass & Schartner (2009a) for a proof): 
Lemma 1: Let Γ = ({1, 2}, {S1, S2}, {A, B}) be a bi-matrix game. Set n = |PS1|, m = |PS2| and 
let A, B be the payoff matrices A ∈ Rn×m and  B ∈ Rn×m  for players 1 and 2, respectively. Let 
Γ0 = ({1, 2}, {S1, S2}, {A, -A}) be the zero-sum game from player 1's perspective, i.e. with the 
payoff of player 2 being the negative payoff of player 1 (disregarding the unknown matrix 
B), and let v denote the value of the game Γ0. Then  
v ≤ (x*)TAy* 
for all existing Nash-Equilibria (x*, y*) of the game Γ. 
This is the formal permission to use (–A) as a substitute for the adversary’s payoff, for 
getting a lower bound on the achievable utility. In other words, unless the adversary’s 
purpose is truly opposite to our own one, we can only be off better than expected. Also, the 
bound cannot be improved, as examples by Rass (2009) demonstrate. In the following, we 
denote a random variable X with discrete distribution x by writing X ~ x. 
Definition 2 (Loss): Let i ∈ {1, 2} denote a player in a two-person game with pure strategy 
set PSi, and Si denoting the associated (mixed) strategy space. Assume that the utility 
function  u: PS1×PS2  → I ⊂ R+ to be a mapping into a compact set I. The loss is a random 
variable L measuring the difference between the actual and the possible outcome under the 
chosen pure strategies. It is defined as L :=(max I) – u(X, Y), where X ~ x ∈ S1, Y ~ y ∈ S2. 
Based on this, we can define risk as the expected loss. This is in alignment with the definition 
of risk as the product of probability and damage, as used by the German BSI (2008), as well 
as Hammer (1999). 
Definition 3 (Risk): With the notation from Definition 2, player i's risk (for i ∈ {1, 2}) when 
choosing the strategies x ∈ S1  and y ∈ S2, is defined as the expected loss under this strategy 
choice, namely ri(x, y) = E(L) = (max I) – Ex,y(ui(X, Y)), where for the random variables X and 
Y have the discrete distributions x and y, respectively, and the risk is dependent on the 
choices of player i's opponent. 
It is straightforward to reformulate Definition 2 and Definition 3 for more than two entities. 
However, this general formulation is not required in the sequel, and thus omitted. The core 
concept upon which we can analyze security in a decision-theoretic sense is introduced 
through 
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Definition 4 (Vulnerability): Let A ∈ In×m be the model matrix set up by Alice and Bob, 
where these two have n = |PS1| pure strategies for communicating, facing an adversary 
with m = |PS2| pure strategies to choose from. Assuming that the set I ⊂ R+ to be compact, 
the vulnerability ρ(A) is defined as 
ρ(A)  := (max I) – v(Γ0),  
where v(Γ) = maxx miny xTAy is the value of the associated zero-sum game (see Lemma 1)  
Γ0 = ({1, 2}, {S1, S2}, {A, -A})  and S1, S2 are the probability spaces over PS1, PS2, respectively. 
The vulnerability is directly derived from the game-matrix A, which we shall refer to as the 
model matrix in the following. Summarizing the construction, this matrix displays the 
utility for the honest parties, for each possible (pure) transmission and (pure) attack 
strategy.  
Example 2: The value of the game with the matrix given previously is found as v = 1/3, so 
that the vulnerability comes to max I – v = 1 – 1/3 = 2/3. 
4. Results 
An immediate consequence of the definition of vulnerability and Lemma 1 is the following 
result. We refrain from stating the proofs for the cited assertions and refer the interested 
reader to the work of Rass (2009). 
Theorem 1 (Rass (2009)): If the message valuation scale is binary in the sense that every 
message scores 1 when being delivered successfully, and zero when getting deciphered by 
Eve, then ρ(A) is the maximum probability of a concealed message becoming disclosed. 
Capturing utility in terms of entropy permits quantification of the expected leak of 
information. In other words, the decision-theoretic approach yields a measure of secrecy-
capacity of a network via a corollary to Theorem 1: 
Theorem 2 (Rass (2009)): For a (random) message M with Shannon-entropy H(M), the 
amount h by which the adversary's uncertainty (Shannon-entropy) is decreased upon a 
(secret) communication between Alice and Bob satisfies  
h ≤ ρ(A).H(M)  
where ρ(A) is the vulnerability, and the model matrix is set up with the binary scale I = {0, 1} 
(i.e. a 1 in the matrix corresponds to one successful secret delivery, and 0 means failure). 
Example 3: Knowing that the vulnerability of our example model is 0.667, this is the 
maximum probability of having a secret communication disclosed when communicating 
over the network. Theorem 2 states that no more than two thirds of any secret information 
will leak out in the long run average. 
Whereas Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 capture long-term average secrecy of a channel, the 
decision on whether or not the next transmission should be started calls for a measure of 
risk for a single concrete transmission. If L is the random variable that measures the loss (i.e. 
the difference between the maximum utility and the actual utility) of the next transmission, 
then the next result upper-bounds the probability for loosing more than indicated by the 
vulnerability (in accordance with Theorem 1). 
Theorem 3 (Rass (2009)): Let the secret communication between Alice and Bob be modelled 
by a bi-matrix game Γ and let Γ0 be the associated zero-sum game as in Lemma 1. Let A be 
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the model-matrix. If Alice and Bob play an equilibrium strategy for Γ0, then for ε ≥ 0, the 
random loss L ∈ I satisfies 
⎟⎟⎠
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where  ρ(A) is the vulnerability and the constant C is the solution of the optimization 
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Determining the constant C is easy and requires only polynomial effort. The optimization 
problem is convex so the solution is unique. Asking for the loss that a sequence of messages 
can cause requires taking possible interdependencies of the messages into account. This 
rules out applying Theorem 3 repeatedly to upper-bound the probability of the joint loss. 
Instead, one can prove the following assertion to hold for several, possibly interdependent 
transmissions. 
Theorem 4 (Rass (2009)): Let A denote the model matrix of the honest participants Alice and 
Bob. Assume I ⊂ R+ to be compact. If n (possibly interdependent) messages are transmitted 
over the network, then for any ε ≥ 0, 
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if Li denotes the loss  if the adversary mounts an attack on the i-th transmission. 
5. Applications 
The framework sketched here is general and applies to a wide range of scenarios. Despite its 
initial purpose being the security assessment of quantum networks, the results apply to any 
finite two-person game. Future research includes applications to classical networks, as well 
as considering more general communication scenarios like broadcasting. 
5.1 Perfectly secure transmission 
A conclusion that can be drawn from Theorem 4 is the possibility of perfectly secure 
communication over an arbitrarily insecure channel. Assume I = {0, 1}, so that utility 1 (cf. 
step 3 of the modelling process) corresponds to secure and secret delivery, and 0 
corresponds to successful adversarial extraction of the secret. Consider the event that for n 
messages, mini Li ≥ 1. Since the i-th loss Li ∈ I = {0, 1}, this implies Li = 1 for all i = 1, 2, …, n. 
In other words, the upper bound given by Theorem 4 refers to the even that the adversary 
extracted all messages from the sequence. Letting n become large, this probability will decay 
exponentially fast, which means that with overwhelming probability, at least one message 
will remain concealed and secure. If an (n,n)-secret sharing as described in previous 
paragraphs is employed, then the probability of extracting any secret content is negligible. 
Notice that none of the results presented relies on a hypothesis about the adversary’s 
www.intechopen.com
 Decision Support Systems 
 
400 
intentions or a mechanism of detecting the success of a transmission. Hence, we can draw 
strong conclusions from a game-theoretic model that we cannot even fully specify. The 
formal statement of the above intuition is 
Theorem 5 (Rass (2009)): Let the pair (Alice, Bob) set up their model matrix with binary 
entries uij ∈ {0, 1}, where uij  = 1 if and only if a message can securely be delivered by 
choosing the i-th pure strategy, and the adversary uses his j-th pure strategy for attacking. 
Then ρ(A) ∈ [0, 1], and 
• for any ε > 0, if ρ(A) < 1, then a protocol exists so that Alice and Bob can communicate 
with an eavesdropping probability of at most ε. 
• if ρ(A) = 1, then the probability of the message becoming extracted by the adversary is 
equal to 1. 
Rephrasing the implication of Theorem 5 reveals that the possibility of secure 
communication is completely characterized by the vulnerability. This is a significantly 
stronger result than the ones presented by Wang & Desmedt (2008), as its assertion is valid 
for any given network topology. In particular, it opens the possibility of optimizing a given 
topology, as we will show later. The vulnerability is compatible with the security concept as 
given by 
Definition 5 (Wang & Desmedt (2008)): Let a message transmission protocol be given, and 
call adv the adversary's transcript of an eavesdropped execution. Assume the transmission 
protocol to take a message m and a random sequence r of coin-flips as input, and denote the 
adversary's information as adv(m, r). Furthermore, let mA denote Alice's input, and let mB 
denote Bob's final output of the protocol. 
• Let δ < ½. A message transmission protocol is δ-reliable if, with probability at least 1 – δ, 
Bob terminates with mA = mB. The probability is taken over the possible choices of mA 
and the coin-flips of all nodes. If δ = 0, then the protocol is said to be reliable. 
• A message transmission protocol is ε-private if, for every two messages m0, m1 and every 
r, ε2)),(Pr()),(Pr( 10 ≤=−=∑
c
crmadvcrmadv  that is, if the distributions of the 
adversary's views for transmissions of m0, m1 differ at most by 2ε in the 1-norm. The 
probabilities are taken over the coin-flips of the honest parties, and the summation is 
over all possible values of the adversaries view. A 0-private protocol is called perfectly 
private. 
• A message transmission protocol is (ε, δ)-secure, if it is δ-reliable and ε-private. A (0,0)-
secure protocol is called perfectly secure. 
This definition is perfectly compatible with our understanding of vulnerability, as indicated 
by the following 
Theorem 6 (Rass (2009)): The vulnerability is a measure of privacy and reliability in the 
sense of Definition 5 because if Alice and Bob set up their model matrix with entries  
⎩⎨
⎧=
                                                    otherwise0,
ly;successful delivered is message the if,1
iju
 
for every strategy combination of the honest parties and the adversary, then the protocol is 
ρ-reliable, where ρ = ρ(A) is the vulnerability. If Alice and Bob set up their model matrix 
with entries uij such that 
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 ⎩
⎨⎧=
                                                                                otherwise0,
content; secret the aboutnothing  learns adversary the if,1
iju
 
for every strategy combination of the honest parties and the adversary, then the protocol is 
(2ρ)-private, where ρ = ρ(A) is the vulnerability. 
5.2 Denial-of-service resilience 
Denial of service scenarios are of particular interest in the field of quantum cryptography, 
because communication is aborted upon detecting the presence of an adversary. Since there 
is no evasive mechanism that could ensure the function of a link under eavesdropping, a 
denial of service is most easily mounted in a quantum network. Any small physical damage 
may raise the error rate sufficiently to logically cut the link. Other examples include classical 
(electrical) networks, or even distributed attacks on computer networks via bot-nets. All of 
these can easily be modelled and analyzed with our approach. 
Modelling scenarios with random influences (such as intrusion detection systems that have 
only a high probability of preventing an attack, but offer no provable security assurance) is 
straightforward by switching from a deterministic utility function to a random one. 
Basically, this amounts to replacing a random outcome by its expectation. Examples are 
networks that employ intrusion detection and prevention mechanisms. These mechanisms 
evade an intruder with a certain probability, but not with certainty, so the possible outcomes 
uij = 1 (successful transmission), or uij = 0 (transmission failure) occur with probabilities p 
and 1 – p, respectively. In that case, one would set up a matrix over the set I = [0, 1] instead 
of I = {0, 1}, and replace each random utility Uij with its expected value E(Uij) = p.uij.  
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Fig. 2. Network in jeopardy of a DoS-Attack 
Example 4: Take the network topology as shown in Fig. 2, and assume the adversary with 
threshold two, i.e. no more than two links can be attacked simultaneously. Moreover, 
assume that only the dashed links are assumed vulnerable, which corresponds to the 
assumption that the neuralgic point is the last mile connecting the peer’s machine to the 
(quantum) backbone. The links inside the network are assumed protected from 
unauthorized access. This time, we are interested in whether or not Alice (node 1) and Bob 
(node 4) are in danger of suffering a denial-of-service attack, that is, the adversary’s purpose 
is cutting the channel between the two by exploiting the eavesdropping detection facility of 
quantum cryptography. Setting up the game with a binary matrix with entries 
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧=
                                        path) the blocked has (Eve otherwise0,
intact; path chosen  the leaves in  edges theremoving  if,1 12 ij
ij
ss
u
 
we end up with a 9×15 matrix. Solving the game yields the value v = 1/3, so ρ = 1 – v = 2/3. 
The assertion of Theorem 1 is not limited to pure communication, and we may directly 
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conclude that the probability of a successful denial-of-service is at most ρ = 2/3. Let Alice 
and Bob retransmit their message in case of failure. Then the probability of mounting a 
denial-of-service is for, say 100 messages, by Theorem 5 no more than exp(-100(1/3)2/2) ≈ 
0.00386 (choose the maximal ε, which is ε = 1/3). 
5.3 Constructing networks with optimal security 
Decision-makers that ought to assess several security enhancements for an existing network 
may be interested in an objective measure of security. The vulnerability as given in 
Definition 4 provides a natural scoring functional that can be optimized under given budget 
constraints. 
Sticking with an eavesdropping scenario for simplicity, consider a network whose topology 
does not permit perfectly secure message transmission. This could be the case if a company 
owns fibre-optic lines and wants to enter the market as a backbone provider for quantum 
networks. Such secure delivery services are most interesting in R&D-scenarios, where 
several spatially separated departments work on highly valuated research projects with the 
need to exchange sensitive data regularly. Different, yet equally important, examples are 
secure backups, which should be located outside the company’s premises (due to fire 
protection requirements). 
In this section, we consider the first of the following two questions, where the second is 
straightforward to tackle. 
• Given a set of environmental and monetary constraints, what is the best security we can 
achieve under the given conditions? 
• Given a minimum security level, what is the cheapest extension to the network that 
achieves the desired security? 
Since the vulnerability as defined up to now refers to only two players, one needs a more 
general tool: for a graph G = (V, E), and a set of instances U ⊆ V, we will consider the 
maximum vulnerability over each pair of communicating nodes in the set U in the graph G. 
This quantity is 
)),((max:),(
,,
tsAGUR
tsUts
ρ
≠∈
=
 
 
where ρ(A(s,t)) is the vulnerability that is derived from the model matrix A, which now 
depends on the specific pair (s, t). For simplicity, we restrict ourselves to extensions on the 
link level of a network. That is, given a graph G = (V, E), and a set E’ of links that can 
technically be realized, we seek a minimum cost extension VVEE ×⊆⊆ '~ such that the 
extended topology )
~
,(' EEVG ∪=  has minimum vulnerability. Costs of various types (staff, 
maintenance, etc) can be captured through a vector-valued function c: E’ → Rd, where d ≥ 1. 
The components of c refer to different types of costs that cannot be merged into a single 
functional. Having specified some constraint M ∈Rd we ought to solve the following 
nonlinear optimization problem: 
 
MEcts
EEVGUR
EE
≤
∪
⊆
)
~
(..
))
~
,(,(min
'
~
 
(1)
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By reducing this problem to the 0-1-Integer programming problem, as done by Rass (2009), 
we obtain the following 
Theorem 7: The optimization problem (1) is at least NP-hard. 
Unfortunately, this result provides some evidence that we can hardly do better than solving 
the optimization procedure as follows: 
1. Enumerate all feasible extensions to the network. That is, find all extensions that obey 
the cost constraints. 
2. Determine the vulnerability of the extended network for each of these cases, and select 
the extension with the least vulnerability. 
This method can be applied to illustrate the optimization through the following 
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Fig. 3. Initial Network 
Example 5 (Rass & Schartner (2009b)): Given a graph G as shown in Fig. 3, suppose that the 
set E’ of candidate extensions comprises the dashed links, i.e. E’ = {(1, 6), (1, 11), (2, 5), (5, 6), 
(5, 7), (6, 11), (9, 11)}. The weights of the links are the costs for building them. It is easy to 
verify that the network vulnerability excluding the dashed links is 1, which is due to node 
5’s inability to communicate with any other node, once an adversary with threshold at least 
1 compromises node 4. In our example, assume that each pair within the set of 
communicating nodes C = {1, 2, 5, 11} uses a (2, 2)-secret sharing scheme, and that the 
adversary has threshold 2, i.e. Eve can compromise any two nodes in the network, except for 
{1, 2, 5, 11}. Enumerating the paths that a fixed pair can use by i = 1, 2, …, and Eve’s possible 
attacks by j = 1, 2, …, the game-matrix has an entry uij = 0 if and only if Eve’s attack is a cut 
between the i-th pair (alternatively, Eve mounted a person-in-the-middle attack), and 1 
otherwise. The cost functional is assumed additive and scalar-valued. Given a budget limit 
of M = 13, we ask for a selection of dashed links that gives us the minimum achievable 
network jeopardy. Solving the optimization problem, we can find 14 different solutions, 
each of which satisfies the budget limit and provides a network jeopardy of 1/3 (in a real-life 
situation, the set of admissible solutions may further be restricted to limitations on cable 
length, or other additional constraints). One such solution (the cheapest among the 
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candidates, with cost 9) is )}11,6(),7,5(),6,5(),11,1{(
~ =E , and the resulting, security enhanced 
network, is depicted in Fig. 4. 
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Fig. 4. Optimized Network 
6. Conclusion 
We devised a simple to use framework for analyzing complex scenarios with tools from 
game theory. Motivated by recent results regarding the impossibility of perfect end-to-end 
secrecy, we point out decision theory as a valuable tool for obtaining strong general results 
in the field of system security. Unlike many other approaches, our method is not limited to a 
specific scenario, and can equally well be applied to tackle confidentiality, authenticity, 
integrity and availability aspects of a system. 
The framework has yet been formulated for the communication of two instances, and 
generalizations to broadcast scenarios are a direction for future research. The vulnerability 
measure that we obtained may also be used with time-series forecasting techniques to build 
an automatic alarming system that keeps track of ongoing evolution and predicts the future 
security of the given system.  
A third avenue of future research is the analysis of the optimization problem. Some steps of 
turning the problem into a standard mixed integer optimization problem have been 
accomplished (see Rass (2009) for details), and commercial software packages can be used 
for tackling the arising problems. The results allow casting the problem of designing a 
secure network into a combinatorial optimization problem, using a widely automated 
procedure. Protocol parameters, protocols themselves, transmission paths, and most other 
parameters can be enumerated automatically. This way, we can automatically create the 
strategy sets for the honest instances. Network vulnerability scanners help identifying the 
attack strategies, so these can be set up in an automated manner as well. It is easy to set up 
the game-matrix, even if random influences are considered. Finally, the analysis, 
optimization and prediction of future values can also be handed over to software solutions, 
making the methodology flexible, efficient and a valuable add-on for security analysis in a 
broad range. 
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